Abstract-For cryptographic applications, normal bases have received considerable attention, especially for hardware implementation. In this article, we consider fast software algorithms for normal basis multiplication over the extended binary field GFð2 m Þ. We present a vector-level algorithm which essentially eliminates the bit-wise inner products needed in the conventional approach to the normal basis multiplication. We then present another algorithm which significantly reduces the dynamic instruction counts. Both algorithms utilize the full width of the data-path of the general purpose processor on which the software is to be executed. We also consider composite fields and present an algorithm which can provide further speed-ups and an added flexibility toward hardware-software codesign of processors for very large finite fields.
INTRODUCTION
T HE extended binary finite field GFð2 m Þ of degree m is used in important cryptographic operations, such as key exchange, signing, and verification. For today's security applications, the minimum values of m are considered to be l60 in the elliptic curve cryptography and 1,024 in the standard discrete log-based cryptography. Elliptic curve crypto-systems, which were proposed by Koblitz [15] and Miller [23] independently, use relatively smaller field sizes, but require a considerable amount of field arithmetic for each group operation (i.e., addition of two points). In such crypto-systems, often the most complicated and expensive module is the finite field arithmetic unit. As a result, it is important to develop suitable finite field arithmetic algorithms and architectures that can meet the constraints of various implementation technologies, such as hardware and software.
For cryptographic applications, the most frequently used GFð2 m Þ arithmetic operations are addition and multiplication. Compared to the former, the latter is a much more complicated and time-consuming operation. The complexity of GFð2 m Þ multiplication very much depends on how the field elements are represented. For hardware implementation of a multiplier, the use of normal bases has received considerable attention and a number of hardware architectures and implementations have been reported (see, for example, [1] , [2] , [19] , [10] , [35] ). Unlike hardware, so far software implementation of a GFð2 m Þ multiplier using normal bases has not been that popular. This is mainly due to a number of practical considerations. Most importantly, normal basis multiplication algorithms require inner products or matrix multiplications over the ground field GF (2) . Such computations are not directly supported by most of today's general purpose processors. These computations require bit-by-bit logical AND and XOR operations, which are not efficiently implemented using the instruction set supported by the processors. Also, when a high-level programming language such as C is used, the cyclic shifts needed for field squaring operations are not as efficient as they are in hardware.
In this paper, we consider algorithms for fast software normal basis (NB) multiplication on general purpose processors. We discuss how the conventional bit-level algorithm for normal basis multiplication fails to utilize the full data-path of the processor and makes its software implementation inefficient. In view of this, a vector-level normal basis multiplication algorithm is presented which eliminates the matrix multiplication over GF (2) and significantly reduces the number of dynamic instructions. We then derive another scheme for normal basis multiplication to further improve the speed. We present implementation results of these schemes for the five fields recommended by NIST for NB multiplication in ECDSA (elliptic curve digital signature algorithm) [25] , i.e., m ¼ 163, 233, 283, 409, 571. For example, it takes 99s and requires only 322 bytes of memory for a GF ð2
163 Þ multiplication using NB on Pentium III 533 MHz PC. We also consider normal basis multiplication over certain special classes of composite fields. We show that normal basis multipliers over such composite fields can provide an additional speed-up. For example, it requires 114s and 25 bytes of memory for multiplication over GF ð2 299 Þ. Composite fields also offer a great deal of flexibility toward hardware-software codesign of very large finite field processors.
The organization of this article is as follows: In Section 2, the NB representation and its conventional multiplication algorithm are presented. This algorithm has been proposed by NIST for NB multiplication in ECDSA [25] where all recommended values of m are prime. Then, in Section 3, we extend NIST's algorithm to a vector-level multiplication algorithm which uses the full width of the data-path of the processor. In Section 4, a more efficient algorithm for NB multiplication is presented. In this section, this algorithm is also compared with other algorithms. Then, we present an algorithm for multiplication over finite fields GF ð2 m Þ with composite values of m in Section 5. Finally, a few concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES

Normal Basis Representation
It is well-known that there exists a normal basis in the field GF ð2 m Þ over GF ð2Þ for all positive integers m. By finding an element 2 GF ð2 m Þ such that f; 2 ; Á Á Á ; 2 mÀ1 g is a basis of GF ð2 m Þ over GF ð2Þ, any element A 2 GF ð2 m Þ can be represented as
where a i 2 GF ð2Þ, 0 i m À 1, is the ith coordinate of A.
In this paper, this normal basis representation of A will be written in short as A ¼ ða 0 ; a 1 ; Á Á Á ; a mÀ1 Þ. Now, consider the following matrix:
whose entries belong to GFð2 m Þ. Writing these entries with respect to the NB, one obtains the following:
where M i s are m Â m multiplication matrices whose entries belong to GF ð2Þ. Following [23] , we now give the definition of the complexity of an NB as follows.
Definition 1. The numbers of 1s in all M i s are equal. Let us define this number by
which is known as the complexity of the NB. In (3), HðM i Þ refers to the Hamming weight, i.e., the number of 1s, in M i .
It is well-known that C N ! 2m À 1 [23] . When C N ¼ 2m À 1, the NB is called an optimal normal basis (ONB). Two types of ONBs were constructed by Mullin et al. [23] . Gao and Lenstra [7] showed that these two types are all the ONBs in GF ð2 m Þ. As an extension of the work on ONBs, Ash et al. in [4] proposed low complexity normal bases of type t, where t is a positive integer. These low complexity bases are referred to as Gaussian Normal Basis (GNB). When t ¼ 1 and 2, the GNBs become the two types of ONBs of [4] 
Conventional NB Multiplication Algorithm
Below, we give the conventional algorithm for normal basis multiplication. This algorithm is for t even only (the reader is referred to [11] for an algorithm with t odd). The case of t even is of particular interest for implementing high speed cryptosystems based on Koblitz curves. Such curves with points over GF ð2 m Þ exist for m ¼ 163, 233, 283, 409, 571, where normal bases have t even. Let A ¼ ða 0 ; a 1 ; Á Á Á ; a mÀ1 Þ and B ¼ ðb 0 ; b 1 ; Á Á Á ; b mÀ1 Þ be the elements of GF ð2 m Þ, then the ith coordinate of the product C ¼ AB is computed as [13] :
In (4), p ¼ tm þ 1 and
where u is an integer of order t mod p. In order to realize (4), the following algorithm can be used [11] where c i is computed in the inner loop of this algorithm. Note that, in the following algorithm, A ( i (resp. A ) i) denotes the i-fold left (resp. right) cyclic shifts of the coordinates of A.
The algorithm uses the fact that the ði þ jÞth coordinate of A (i.e., a iþj ) is equal to the jth coordinate of A ( i. It also requires the input sequence F ð1Þ; Fð2Þ; Á Á Á ; Fðp À 1Þ to be precomputed using (5) .
A ( 1; B ( 1 7. } Software implementation of Algorithm 1 is not very efficient for the following reasons: First, in each execution of line 4, one coordinate of each of A and B are accessed. These accesses are such that their software implementation is rather unsystematic and typically requires more than one instruction. Second, in line 4, the mod 2 multiplication of the coordinates, which is implemented by bit-level logical AND operation, is performed mðp À 2Þ times in total and the mod 2 addition, which is implemented by bit-level logical XOR operation, is performed 1 4 mðp À 2Þ times, on average, assuming that A and B are two random inputs. In the C programming language, these mod 2 multiplication and addition operations correspond to about mðp À 2Þ AND and 1 4 mðp À 2Þ XOR instructions, 1 respectively. It is worth mentioning here that, although each XOR/AND instruction of the processor is capable of working on 16 or 32-bit words (i.e., the processor's data-path is 16/32 bits wide), the above algorithm does not make use of the full data-path.
VECTOR-LEVEL NB MULTIPLICATION
In this section, we discuss improvements to Algorithm 1. One crucial improvement is that most arithmetic operations are done on vectors instead of bits. This enables us to use the full data-path of the processor on which the software is executed. The assumption of Algorithm 1 that t is even is also used in the remaining discussion of this section. The case of t odd is considered in Appendix A. Lemma 1. For GNB of type t, where t is even, the sequence F ðnÞ of p À 1 integers as defined above is mirror symmetric around the center, i.e., F ðnÞ ¼ F ðp À nÞ, 1 n p À 1.
Proof. In (5), t is the smallest nonzero integer such that
From (5) and Lemma 1, one has F ð1Þ ¼ F ðp À 1Þ ¼ 0. For 1 n p À 2, let us define
Now, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For ÁF ðnÞ as defined above and for t even, the following holds:
Proof. Using (6), one obtains F ðn þ 1Þ ¼ P n i¼1 ÁF ðiÞ. Applying Lemma 1 into (6), one can also write ÁF ðp À nÞ ¼ ÀÁF ðn À 1Þ mod m; 2 n p À 1; which results in
and ÁF p À 1 2 ¼ 0:
Using Lemma 1 and (6), one can write (4) as follows:
For a particular GNB, the values of ÁF ðnÞ, 1 n p À 2, are fixed and are to be determined only once, i.e., at the time of choosing the basis. Additionally, Corollary 1 implies that it is sufficient to store only half (i.e., 2 ) of these ÁF ðnÞs.
We now state the vector-level algorithm for t even as follows:
S B ( ÁF ðnÞ 7. } In line 4 of Algorithm 2, for X; Y 2 GF ð2 m Þ, X Y denotes the bit-wise AND operation between coordinates of X and Y , i.e., X Y ¼ ðx 0 y 0 ; x 1 y 1 ; Á Á Á ; x mÀ1 y mÀ1 Þ. The following example can be used to illustrate the operation of this algorithm.
Example 1. For the type 2 GNB in GF ð2
5 Þ, one has p ¼ 11 and u ¼ 10. Thus, the values of F ðnÞ, 1 n 10, using (5) are given in Table 1 . By using (4), the coordinates of C are obtained as:
Also, using (6), one can obtain the values of ÁF ðnÞ. The results are also shown in Table 1 . Here, the multiplication of A ¼ ð01110Þ and B ¼ ð10101Þ is shown using Algorithm 2. Table 2 shows contents of various variables of the algorithm as they are updated. The row with n being "-" is for the initialization step (i.e., line 1) of the algorithm. In order to obtain an overall computation time for a GF ð2 m Þ multiplication using Algorithm 2, the coordinates of the field elements can be divided into d m ! e units where ! corresponds to the data-path width of the processor. Here (and in the rest of the paper), we assume that the processor can perform bit-wise XOR and AND of two !-bit operands using one single XOR instruction and one m ! e cyclic shifts. We assume that an i-fold, 1 i < !, left/right shift can be emulated in the C programming language using a total of instructions. The value of is typically 4 when simple logical instructions, such as AND, SHIFT, and OR, are used. We can now state the following.
Proposition 1. The dynamic instruction count for Algorithm 2 is
given by
For type II optimal normal bases, where t ¼ 2, the following remark can be made. However, for multiplication using type I optimal normal bases, one should use Algorithm 6 in Appendix A.
Remark 1.
For type II optimal normal bases, the dynamic instruction counts for Algorithm 2 is 2ð1 þ Þð2m À 1Þd m ! e.
EFFICIENT NB MULTIPLICATION OVER GF ð2 m Þ
Although the previous algorithm utilizes the full data-path of the processor for NB multiplication and is very suitable and efficient for software implementation, below we present another algorithm which is even more efficient and requires fewer instructions and memory accesses. Also, the cost of this efficient algorithm in terms of dynamic instruction counts and memory requirements is analyzed and then they are compared with those of similar other algorithms.
Algorithm
For the normal basis f;
where v ¼ d mÀ1 2 e. Then, one has the following result from [32] . Lemma 2. Let A and B be two elements of GF ð2 m Þ and C be their product. Then,
; for m even;
where a i s and b i s are the NB coordinates of A and B, respectively. Also, indices and exponents are reduced mod m and
Let h j , 1 j v, be the number of 1s in the normal basis representation of j . Let w j;1 ; w j;2 ; Á Á Á ; w j;hj denote the positions of 1s in the normal basis representation of j , i.e.,
where 0 w j;1 < w j;2 < Á Á Á < w j;hj m À 1. Now, using (11) into Lemma 2, we have the following for m odd: v . This implies that, in the normal basis representation of v , its ith coordinate is equal to its ð m 2 þ i mod mÞth coordinate. Thus, h v is even and one can write
Now, using (13) into Lemma 2 (for m even) and using (12), we have the following theorem, where all indices and exponents are reduced modulo m.
Theorem 1. Let A and B be two elements of GF ð2 m Þ and C be their product. Then,
where
Note that, for a normal basis, the representation of j is fixed and so is w j;k , 1 j v, 1 k h j . Now, define
where w j;k s are as given in (11) . For a particular normal basis, all w j;k s are fixed. Hence, all Áw j;k s need to be determined only at the time of choosing the basis. Using Áw j;k s, below we present an efficient NB (ENB) multiplication algorithm over GF ð2 m Þ for odd values of m. The corresponding algorithm for even values of m is shown in Appendix B. An efficient scheme to compute Áw j;k s can be found in [29] .
In the above algorithm, shifted values of A and B are stored in S A and S B , respectively. In line 6, R 2 GF ð2 m Þ contains ðx 0;j ; x 1;j ; Á Á Á ; x mÀ1;j Þ, i.e., P mÀ1 i¼0 x i;j Table 2 in [24] , one has
and
which are the same two field elements we used in Example 1. Table 3 shows contents of various variables of the algorithm as they are updated (see Table 2 for comparison). The row with j being "-" is for the initialization step (i.e., line 1) of the algorithm.
As can be seen in Algorithm 3, all Áw j;k s have to be precomputed and it is done only once when the basis is chosen. In the above example, they are determined by calculating j s, which is essentially a multiplication process all by itself. For this multiplication, one can use either Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2.
Cost and Comparison
In an effort to determine the cost of Algorithm 3, we give the dynamic instruction counts for its software implementation. We also consider the number of memory accesses to read the precomputed values of Áw j;k . For software implementation of the above algorithm, one would heavily rely on instructions, such as, XOR, AND, and others which can be used to emulate cyclic shifts (in the C like programming language). XOR instructions are needed in
and, so, the total number of instructions to emulate cyclic shifts used in Algorithm 3 is
m ! e. Based on the above discussion, we have the following.
Proposition 2. The dynamic instruction count for Algorithm 3 is
It is noted that the type I ONB only exists when m is even. For this type of bases, an algorithm and its instruction count are presented in Appendix B. For type II ONBs, where the value of m is odd, one can obtain the total instruction for Algorithm 3 by substituting C N ¼ 2m À 1 into (16). However, for the even values of m, where type II ONBs exist, one can use an algorithm presented in Appendix B to further reduce the instruction count. Now, we can state the following.
Remark 2. The dynamic instruction count for ENB multiplication
algorithm when the finite field is defined for type II optimal normal bases is at most ðð2:5 þ 2Þm À ð1:5 þ ÞÞd m ! e.
For software implementation of Algorithm 3, if the loops are not unrolled and the values of Áw j;k s are not hardcoded, one needs to store Áw j;k , 1 j v, 1 k h j . Since the total number of Áw j;k s is P v j¼1 h j and each Áw j;k 2 ½0; m À 1 needs dlog 2 me bits of memory, a total of about C N À1 2 dlog 2 me bits of memory is needed to store the precomputed Áw j;k s. Table 4 compares the number of dynamic instructions of the three algorithms we have described so far. As can be seen in Table 4 , both our proposed schemes (i.e., Algorithms 2 and 3) are superior to the conventional bitlevel multiplication scheme (i.e., Algorithm 1). Also, this Table 5 and for the five binary fields recommended by NIST for ECDSA (elliptic curve digital signature algorithm) [26] . These algorithms have been coded in software using the C programming language. Table 5 also shows timing (in s) for these codes executed on Pentium III 533 MHz PC. The PC has 64 M bytes of RAM, 32 K bytes of L1 cache, and 512 K bytes of L2 cache. Our codes are parameterized in the sense that they can be used for various m and t without major modifications. For high speed implementation, the codes can be optimized for special values of m and t.
Agnew et al. in [1] have proposed a bit-serial architecture for the NB multiplication. Although their work has been targeted to hardware implementation, the main idea can be used for software implementation similar to the vector-level method proposed here. For such a software implementation of [1] , one would require ðC N À 1Þd m ! e, which is about twice that in Algorithm 3 (see Proposition 2). In [32] , one can find software implementation of the NB multiplication for two special cases, namely, two optimal normal bases. The method used in [32] is similar to that of the NB multiplication of [1] .
Very recently, another NB multiplication algorithm suitable for software implementation has been proposed [24] . This algorithm is quite different from the ones discussed here. It uses much more memory, but, with respect to computational time, it is expected to be better than the algorithm presented here and it is possible to combine the work of [24] with that of this article to further improve the performance of NB multiplication in software.
Some of the recently proposed polynomial basis multiplication algorithms, for example, [9] , [17] , create a look-up table on the fly based on one of the inputs (say A) and yield significant speed-ups by processing a group of bits of the other input (i.e., B) at a time. At this point, it is not clear whether such a group-level processing of B can be incorporated into our Algorithm 3. However, if m is a composite number, then one can essentially achieve a similar kind of group-level processing by performing computations in the subfields. This idea is explored in the following section.
EFFICIENT COMPOSITE FIELD NB MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we consider multiplications in the finite field GFð2 m Þ, where m is a composite number. These fields are referred to as composite fields and have been used in the recent past to develop efficient multiplication schemes [26] , [27] . When these fields are to be used for elliptic curve crypto-systems, one must choose m such that its cofactors are large enough to resist the attack described by Galbraith and Smart [6] , [34] . The composite fields which are not vulnerable against the known attacks for elliptic curve crypto-systems are presented in [20] , [5] .
Algorithm
Let us introduce the following lemma from [21] which is used for constructing a composite field normal basis.
Lemma 3 [21] . Let gcdðm 1 ; m 2 Þ ¼ 1. Let N 1 ¼ f 2 j 1 j 0 j m 1 À 1g be a normal basis of GF ð2 m1 Þ over GF ð2Þ. Then, N 1 is also a normal basis of GF ð2 m1m2 Þ over GF ð2 m2 Þ.
Here, we consider composite fields with only two prime factors (i.e., both m 1 and m 2 are prime). This is particularly important for elliptic curve crypto-systems. For such systems in today's security applications, the values of m appear to be in the range of 160 to several hundred only (571 as given in [25] ). To avoid the attack of [6] , one, however, may like to choose m such that it has no small factors such as 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 (see [20] for secure composite values of m 2 ½160; 600). This basically makes one choose m as the product of two primes. Thus, in the following, we give all equations and algorithms for odd degrees. The reader can easily extend it for even degrees using the results of the previous section. Also, the parameters, namely, j , h j , v, , and Áw j;k of the previous section are used here in the context of the subfields GF ð2 m 1 Þ and GF ð2 m 2 Þ by putting an extra sub/superscript, for example, for GF ð2 m2 Þ. Let A and B be two elements of GF ð2 m1 Þ over GF ð2Þ and C be their product. Then,we have the following from [28] : 
where Lemma 4 leads to an algorithm for multiplication in composite fields using normal bases. The algorithm is stated below. 
Algorithm 4. (ECFNB Multiplication of
R . Áw
Cost
In order to obtain the cost of Algorithm 4, we need to evaluate the cost of Algorithm 5, which is
times by the former. Like Algorithm 3, one can determine the dynamic instruction counts of Algorithm 5 to be 1 2 ðC 2 þ m 2 À 2Þ XOR, m 2 AND, and 1 2 ðC 2 þ 2m 2 À 1Þ others to emulate cyclic shifts. The total cost of Algorithm 4 also depends on how subfield elements, each of m 2 bits, are stored in registers. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an element of GF ð2 m2 Þ is stored in one !-bit register (for software implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems with both m 1 and m 2 being prime, most general purpose processors would have ! bit registers where ! ! m 2 ). For ! ¼ 24 and 32, the best values of m 2 are those which have ONBs, i.e., 23 and 29, respectively. Thus, each element of GF ð2 m Þ needs m 1 registers and the cyclic shifts in lines 3 and 7 of Algorithm 4 are almost free of cost (or at best register renaming). Based on this assumption, we give the dynamic instruction counts of Algorithm 4 in Table 6 . In this table, is the number of instructions needed for one subfield cyclic shift in each register and it is four in the C programming language. Table 7 shows the number of instructions and memory requirements of Algorithm 4 for six different composite fields. These six fields are obtained by combining three m 1 s and two m 2 s. Based on Table 1 of [20] , these fields are not vulnerable against the known attacks. Algorithm 4 is also coded for these composite fields using the C programming language. The actual timing (in s) of Algorithm 4 executed on Pentium III 533 MHz PC is also shown in Table 7 . In order to obtain parameters of the finite fields GF ð2 m1 Þ and GF ð2 m 2 Þ used in Algorithm 4, we have used Table 10 and Table 11 of [29] . The results are presented in Table 9 of Appendix C.
Comparison and Comments
Normal Basis Multipliers
In order to compare the cost of Algorithm 4 with that of Algorithm 6 of [3] which uses m ¼ n Á 2 e , one can let m 1 ¼ 2 e and m 2 ¼ n; gcdð2; nÞ ¼ 1. The condition that gcdð2; nÞ ¼ 1 enables us to use Algorithm 4; however, it is not needed for Algorithm 6 of [3] . In [3] , the complexity of GF ð2 m Þ multiplication is given in terms of the number of subfield, i.e., GF ð2 n Þ, operations. Table 8 compares the number of subfield operations required in Algorithm 4 and that in [3] . In this 
Multipliers Based on Polynomial and Dual Bases
In addition to normal bases, in the literature at least two other types of bases, namely, polynomial and dual bases, have received considerable attention for implementation of multipliers over GF ð2 m Þ [33] , [16] , [8] , [15] . Multiplication algorithms that use these two types of bases usually have regular structures and can easily take advantage of fixed irreducible polynomials, which define the fields. In addition, they can also be made to operate in digit serial fashion to provide improved performance (perhaps at the cost of some memory [9] ). As a result, dual and/or polynomial basis multipliers can be faster than a normal basis multiplier (e.g., Algorithm 4). For the purpose of illustration, below we mention three pertinent multipliers where the values of m are composite.
Schroeppel et al. in [33] 178 Þ. In each of the three cases above, the field dimension has a small prime factor (i.e., 5 for [33] , 2 for both [8] and [16] ). The algorithm of [33] does not make use of the small factor 5, but yields a high speed multiplier by carefully choosing the irreducible polynomial (namely, x 155 þ x 62 þ 1) to define the field. In our implementation, we have restricted the smallest factor to be 13 or more. A smaller factor is expected to improve the timing results reported in Table 7 (perhaps at the expense of reduced level of security for certain fields). Also, for m ¼ 178, one can use type 1 optimal normal basis to speed up the multiplication for which an algorithm is included in Appendix B.
As can be seen from the above discussions, various authors have reported the timing results of their multipliers using different computing platforms and parameters. A fair comparison solely based on timing results is therefore difficult. Nevertheless, software implementation of NB multiplication is important. Such an implementation is crucial in the point halving and add algorithm for elliptic curve point multiplication [13] . It is also very useful for the Frobenius endomorphism used with Koblitz curve-based crypto-systems. Thus, the work presented in this article is a step forward in this direction.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a number of software algorithms for normal basis multiplication over GF ð2 m Þ have been presented. Both Algorithms 2 and 3 make maximal use of the full width of the data-path of the processor on which the software is to be executed and they provide significant speed-ups compared to the conventional bit-level multiplication scheme (i.e., Algorithm 1). Algorithms 2 and 3 are particularly suitable if m is a prime. Such values of m are of importance, especially for designing high-speed crypto-systems based on Koblitz curves and for protecting elliptic curve crypto-systems against the attack of Galbraith and Smart [6] . Both Algorithms 2 and 3 have been coded for software implementation using C and our timing results show that Algorithm 3 is about 200 percent faster than Algorithm 2. These results are for those five Gaussian normal bases over the binary fields which NIST has described in their ECDSA document [25] . For the purpose of using NIST parameters, although we have presented our results for Gaussian normal bases, our algorithms are quite generic and can be used for any normal bases of GF ð2 m Þ over GF ð2Þ. We have also considered composite fields with m ¼ m 1 Á m 2 . To avoid the attack of [6] 
APPENDIX A VECTOR-LEVEL NBV MULTIPLICATION FOR t ODD
In this appendix, we discuss the vector-level NB multiplication algorithm when t is odd. This algorithm, which is similar to Algorithm 2, requires the input sequence F ð1Þ; Fð2Þ; Á Á Á ; Fðp À 1Þ to be precomputed using (5), i.e., F ð2 i u j mod pÞ ¼ i; 0 i m À 1; 0 j < t;
where p ¼ tm þ 1 and u is an integer of order t mod p. Since p should be prime, tm has to be an even integer. Also, t is odd, which implies that m should be even. The ith coordinate of the product C ¼ AB can be obtained as [26] : R :¼ T A þ T B 7.
For k ¼ 1 to h j { 8.
R ) Áw j;k 9.
C :¼ C þ R 10. } 11. } 
APPENDIX C PARAMETERS USED IN ALGORITHMS 4 AND 5
Parameters used in Algorithms 4 and 5 are shown in Table 9 .
